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FOREWORD
In April the Army War College’s Strategic Studies
Institute hosted its Annual Strategy Conference. This year’s
theme, “Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the
Past and the Present,” brought together scholars, serving
and retired military officers, and civilian defense
officials from the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of
penury from Tactitus to Force XXI.
Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky of the Royal Military College of
Canada made the point that for Canada defense policy and
strategy traditionally have been made in “times of penury.”
During the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of a “strategy
of commitment.” Since the end of the Cold War, Ottawa has
adopted a “strategy of choice” derived from Canadian
national interests.
The document upon which Canada bases its defense
policy is the 1994 Canadian White Paper. Dr. Sokolsky argues
that the current defense policy acknowledges the problems
endemic to peacekeeping, but that the rising tide of
peacekeeping operations may have passed. Fortunately, Dr.
Sokolsky maintains, the current White Paper also allows for
a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security.
Canada and the United States have stood together for
more than half a century; allies and partners in war and
peace. As the Canadian Defence Forces and the U.S. Army seek
to shape change rather than to be shaped by it, they cannot
help but profit from an open debate of the difficult issues
that confront them. To that end, the Strategic Studies
Institute presents Dr. Sokolsky’s views for your
consideration.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CANADA, GETTING IT RIGHT THIS TIME:
THE 1994 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER
Introduction.
A cynic might claim that Canada should have no
difficulties adjusting to “strategy during the lean years.”
In the first place, the Ottawa government has never had to
worry about formulating its own national security strategy.
Since confederation in 1867, in war and peace it simply
adopted the strategy of its allies. And in the second, with
the exception of the world wars and the early years of the
1
Cold War, the Canadian Forces (CF) have known little else
but lean times. Indeed, it has been charged that Canada
began collecting its “peace dividend” the first time the
Cold War ended, during the detente of the late 1960s and
early 1970s. For the last 20 years it has spent only 2 per
cent of Gross National Product (GDP) on defense. The socalled “commitment-capability gap” has plagued the CF into
the 1980s, while heightened peacekeeping duties have
continued to place a strain on resources in the first 5
years of the post-Cold War era.
The latest White Paper on defense, released in December
1994, seeks to chart a course that will allow Canada to
better cope with the transformed international security
environment that it faces abroad and the stark fiscal
2
realities that it faces at home. These realities were
brought home by the Federal budget reductions in February
1995. Here, too, the past practice may foster a measure of
scepticism. The three previous White Papers, and the budgets
to fund them, proved to be poor predictors of both global
and domestic trends. Their policy prescriptions seemed to be
more appropriate to the situations which preceded their
release rather than those which followed. As a result, they
had extremely short lives as guides to subsequent defense
policy and force posture decisions.
It is argued here that this time, the White Paper
seems to have gotten it right. It contains a reasoned and
realistic assessment of global trends and, more importantly,
of what domestic politics will allow. While not articulating
a ‘strategy’ in the classic understanding of the term, the
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White Paper does provide an approach to the role of defense
policy in support of overall Canadian foreign objectives
which more closely matches commitments with capabilities.
This is not, however, because the CF are to be given the
capabilities they have so long been denied, but rather
because the current policy adopts a leaner view of what
Canada’s commitments should be.
Getting It Wrong: White Papers 1964-1987.
The fundamentals of post-1945 Canadian defense policy
were set during the early years of the Cold War and remained
remarkably constant until the late 1980s. Canada accepted
the need for containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union,
especially in Europe, and sought its security in alliance
with the United States and other NATO powers. To this
extent, the late R.B. Byers noted that Canadian defense
policy did not contain a great deal of “independent
4
strategic thought and analysis.”
This meant that force development decisions were
largely driven by allied strategies and political
requirements. Thus, ground and air forces were dispatched to
Europe after the outbreak of the Korean War, while naval
forces were postured primarily to support NATO’s AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW) requirements in the Atlantic. For
North American defense, the air force maintained
interceptors and radar lines to meet the Soviet bomber
threat under the NORAD combined command with the United
States. As Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) forces grew,
NORAD’s role became that of missile warning and attack
assessment, combined with a declining air defense and air
sovereignty role. At sea, the Canadian Navy collaborated
with the United States Navy (USN) in monitoring the ocean
approaches to the continent. In the early 1960s, Canada even
equipped its European and North American forces with
tactical nuclear weapons (under a standard “two-key”
arrangement with the U.S.).
The domestic tasks of the CF, the protection of
sovereignty against nonmilitary threats and assistance to
the civil authorities, were performed by the forces acquired
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to meet the more demanding NATO and NORAD missions. After
the Suez Crisis of 1956, Canada became a major contributor
to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. But, the
forces dispatched for peacekeeping duties were also drawn
from those raised and maintained to fulfil allied roles.
Although at the operational level the CF trained for
nuclear and conventional warfare along side the forces of
allies, at the highest governmental levels the general view
was that the forces bought Ottawa a “seat at the table.”
They allowed Canada to participate in discussions that
touched on global security issues. This involvement
complemented Canada’s status as a major Western industrial
nation. The approach was summed up by James Eayrs in 1965:
. . . the main and overriding motive for the
maintenance of Canadian military establishment
since the second world war has had little to do
with our national security as such . . . it has
had everything to do with underpinning our
diplomatic and negotiating position vis-a-vis
various international organizations and other
5
countries.
In general, this approach to defense policy enjoyed
broad public support throughout the Cold War. Defense was
not a priority public policy item for most Canadians,
therefore, there was relatively little public or media
attention devoted to it. Canadians wanted their country to
remain in NATO and NORAD, and there was a particularly high
acceptance of peacekeeping which many saw as something
distinctively Canadian. However, the public did not want
large amounts of funds spent on defense, even for national
sovereignty purposes.
As a percentage of GDP and the federal budget, defense
spending peaked in the early 1950s. By the early 1960s, the
high cost of weapons, combined with new demands on the
federal government to allocate more to social programs,
compelled a reevaluation of defense policy and how it was
6
conducted. The White Paper on Defence of March 1964 was
“not so much interested in international aspects of Canadian
7
defence policies” as in “reorganizing the Canadian Forces.”
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In the next few years, the headquarters of the separate
services were integrated under a single Chief of the Defence
Staff (CDS), and eventually a National Defence Headquarters
(NDHQ) emerged, combining the military and civilian
leadership of the CF and DND. In 1968, the three services
were themselves unified into a single entity–the Canadian
Forces–divided along environmental or functional lines. The
government argued that the savings derived from this
reorganization could be channelled into new equipment.
While fiscal considerations were the major concern, the
“flexible response” ideas then being put forth by U.S.
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara were used to justify
unification. DND contended this new organization would make
the CF highly mobile and flexible, able to combine air, sea,
and ground units. Such forces, the Minister argued, would be
available to meet the needs of peacekeeping and “brush-fire”
8
wars and related missions.”
The problem was that, since the Korean War, Canada had
deliberately avoided participating in limited or “brush-fire
wars” (and would not do so again until the Gulf War in
1990). Peacekeeping did not involve the deployment of
Canadian troops in the face of hostile fire. As David Burke
observed: “Canada’s world-wide intervention force . . . was
literally all dressed up with nowhere to go . . . Canada had
a structurally unified defence force without a mission to
match. Moreover, since no allied commitment has been
dropped, Canada continued to supply discrete air, sea and
9
land units to NATO and NORAD.” In addition, any savings
from unification, which were supposed to go into capital,
were lost both by reduced defense budgets and inflation.
By the late 1960s, with detente, the Vietnam War, and
concerns about Canadian independence and sovereignty, the
very fundamentals of the Cold War defense policy were being
challenged. In 1969, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
complained that NATO had come to determine all of Canada’s
defense policy and defense policy had come to determine “all
our foreign policy” and thus Canada “had no foreign policy
10
except that which flowed from NATO.” He set about trying to
change this. Henceforth, foreign policy would be the
extension abroad of domestic priorities and defense policy
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would fall in line.
Such an approach was now possible because of the
changed international security environment. The government
assumed that East-West tensions would continue to ease and
that mutual nuclear deterrence reduced the risk of war, and
the European allies could assume more of the burden for
conventional defense. It cut the size of Canada’s forces in
Europe in half, moving the ground forces away from the
inter-German border; discarded tactical nuclear weapons;
said it would not replace the existing tank forces;
indicated less emphasis would be placed on ASW; and looked
forward to curtailing contributions to NORAD. This was
accompanied by cuts in personnel and real reductions in
defense expenditures. All of this was repeated in the 1971
11
White Paper, Defence in the 70’s, which stressed that
domestic roles, especially the protecting of Canadian
sovereignty against nonmilitary threats, fishing violations,
and environmental dangers, would take priority over allied
commitments, as well as peacekeeping, in day-to-day
operations and force posture decisions.
Although reflecting the period of detente, the document
was out of step with NATO’s new strategy of flexible
response and its emphasis upon conventional forces. Yet, as
with the previous White Paper, the 1971 statement did not
withdraw Canada from any allied commitments. In addition,
Canada continued to remain an active contributor to U.N.
peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the Trudeau government had
actually added a pledge to reinforce northern Norway. Thus,
detente began to wane as reduced defense budgets quickly
took their toll, and the 1971 policy was already being
reversed by 1974. As a result of the Defence Structure
Review (DSR), allied commitments, especially those to NATO
as opposed to sovereignty protection, reemerged as the key
determinant of force posture decisions. Defense budgets were
increased. Over the next 10 years, Canada reequipped its
land forces in Germany with new tanks, acquired a new
interceptor for the NATO and NORAD roles and new ASW longrange patrol aircraft (LRPA), and began construction of a
fleet of ASW frigates. In 1985 agreement was reached on the
modernization of NORAD’s air defense capabilities. At the
same time, defense budgets, though rising, meant that
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equipment replacement was slow and fewer were bought.
It was 1987 before the next White Paper was issued,
this time by the Progressive Conservative government of
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Entitled Challenge and
12
Commitment, this document stated explicitly that the
previous Liberal government had gotten it wrong. The
Liberals had been overly optimistic about the course of
East-West relations, had undermined Canada’s credibility
with its allies, and had allowed a dangerous “commitmentcapability gap” to emerge within the CF. In the meantime,
new factors had emerged, especially the advent of cruise
missiles and the growing strategic importance of the Arctic,
which directly threatened North American and Canadian
security. To meet these challenges, the Mulroney government
pledged to dramatically increase defense spending. It would
acquire new and more tanks for the ground forces in Germany,
additional surface ships and LRPAs, and, most ambitiously, a
fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)
capable of under-ice operations. The SSNs were also
justified on the grounds of the need to assert Canadian
sovereignty in waters American SSNs were known to transit.
Of all the three White Papers discussed above, the 1987
document “got it wrong” the most profoundly and had the
shortest life. Its tone reflected the increased East-West
acrimony of the early 1980s and thus found itself caught by
the rapidly changing situation of the Gorbachev years.
Within a few months after its release, the Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed. The Mulroney
government might be excused for not predicting the
subsequent abrupt end to the Cold War, but it had also
completely misread the domestic situation. While public
opinion polls had shown some concern about poor Arctic
sovereignty and the state of the CF equipment, there turned
out to be very little support for SSNs or for major defense
expenditures given the improved international security
13
environment. In addition, it turned out that the Minister
of Defence had secured only tepid and conditional support
from his cabinet colleagues, especially the Minister of
Finance, on the funding formula necessary to implement
14
Challenge and Commitment.
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The Mulroney government began to hedge on its defense
pledges and deliberately avoided discussing the White Paper
during the 1988 federal election campaign. Once returned to
office, its 1989 budget essentially gutted the 1987 White
Paper, cancelling the SSN program and postponing the tank
purchase. Subsequent budgets further reduced defense
expenditures, eventually abandoning new tanks and other
equipment, although continuing with the building of 12 new
frigates and plans to replace land and seaborne helicopters
with the EH 101. Between 1989 and 1992 planned DND
15
expenditures were reduced by $5.6 billion.
16

A statement on defense policy released in April 1992
announced that the CF would be reduced from 81,000 to 75,000
regular force, but the reserves increased from 29,000 to
40,000. Most significantly, while the document reaffirmed
Canada’s commitment to NORAD and NATO, it also announced
that Canada was withdrawing all of its air and ground forces
from Germany. Heretofore, a physical presence in Europe, no
matter how small, was considered a sine qua non for Canadian
defense policy, the necessary price for a seat at the table.
However, as the Conservatives cutback on defense, they
also, following a now familiar Canadian pattern, increased
their commitments and activities. Canada sent forces to
fight in the Gulf War and expanded its peacekeeping
obligations. A new version of the “commitment-capability
gap” appeared to be emerging, one which focused primarily on
the Army which bore the brunt of peacekeeping duties and
which had been least favored in the equipment purchases of
the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In October 1993, the Liberals returned to power in
Ottawa under Prime Minister Jean Chretien. While in
opposition and during the election campaign, they had
criticized the Mulroney government for adopting a Cold War
defense policy, one that was too supportive of the Reagan
and Bush administrations. Among other things, the Liberals
promised a total review of defense and foreign policy,
including public consultations and parliamentary hearings.
In the meantime, the new government moved to curtail defense
spending, including the cancellation of the EH 101
helicopter, whose cost and sophisticated ASW capabilities
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were said to be inconsistent with the changed global
environment. In its February 1994 budget, DND was again hit
with reductions and base closures, including two of the
17
three military colleges.
A Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons and
the Senate began hearings on defense policy in the spring of
1994. It became apparent that two views on the future of the
CF were emerging. The first, set forth by the Canada 21
Council, a group of former governmental officials, senior
officers and academics, argued that Canada should
concentrate on contributing to “common security” throughout
the U.N. and other multilateral organizations. The CF,
especially the Army, should be postured primarily for
traditional peacekeeping as opposed to high intensity
combat. Canada would maintain its alliance ties, such as
NATO and NORAD, but only insofar as these were consistent
with the emphasis upon common security. Many of the Air
18
Force and the Navy’s larger units could be retired. The
second view was that Canada still confronted a “dangerous
world,” wherein alliance ties would be important and wherein
19
the CF had to maintain a balanced combat-capable posture.
20

In its report, the Special Joint Committee favored
maintaining combat-capable forces and existing alliance
ties. This was the direction the CF wanted to go in the new
White Paper. But, in doing so, the forces had to fashion a
policy that was consistent with the post-Cold War security
environment, overall Canadian foreign policy, and, above
all, domestic political and fiscal realities.
Doing Less and Doing With Less: The 1994 White Paper.
The 1994 White Paper reflects the more secure, yet
uncertain international strategic environment that Canada
now faces. It begins by declaring that “the primary
obligation” of the Department of National Defence (DND) and
the Canadian Forces “is to protect the country and its
citizens from challenges to their security . . . In the
final analysis, a nation not worth defending is a nation not
21
worth preserving.” The document stresses that the basic
nature of the threats to Canadian security has changed–that
regional and ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, global
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overpopulation and environmental degradation all compete for
attention on the global security stage. But, as the February
1995 government statement on foreign policy, Canada in the
World, emphasizes, “direct threats to Canada’s territory are
22
diminished.” Future challenges to Canadian security are
likely to be of a nonmilitary nature, economic,
environmental and demographic. Thus, while the “Government
considers it necessary to maintain a military capability
appropriate to this still uncertain and evolving
international environment, including continued membership in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North
American Aerospace Defence Command, “we are making
adjustments within that capability to enhance our ability to
contain conflict.” In the February 1995 budget, DND took
more hits over and above those announced last year. It would
appear then, that while Canada is worth preserving and
defending, it can be done with less military capability.
Overall, the current defense policy is based more upon
domestic determinants rather than trying to fashion the CF
to keep pace with allied demands and strategies. Most
notable is the diminished role given NATO, heretofore the
central pillar of Canadian defense policy and force
structure. At the same time, multiple roles and, indeed,
multilateralism, are very much a part of the new defense
policy and, certainly, the White Paper calls for the
establishment of new military ties with countries of Latin
America and the Pacific. But while the White Paper promises
a global presence for Canada, it, along with the budget,
does imply global commitments.
As in previous White Papers, the current policy largely
retains the four traditional roles for the Canadian Forces;
sovereignty protection, NATO, bilateral military cooperation
with the United States (especially NORAD), and peacekeeping
will be retained. Previous White Papers have rhetorically
reordered priorities, but actual practice and force building
have tended to reinforce the centrality of NATO and, to a
lesser extent, bilateral cooperation as key determinants in
defense policy. The 1994 Defence White Paper and the 1995
budget mark a significant change in this approach. Canada
has already withdrawn its air and ground forces from
Germany. The government will continue to supply maritime
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forces to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and to provide
crews to the NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft and
individual personnel to various NATO staff positions.
Forces withdrawn and retained in Canada will be available to
the Alliance consistent with allied strategy, which foresees
no major challenge to Western European security and will
rely upon mobilized forces in the event one should emerge.
But in the White Paper, commitments and contributions to
NATO are included under general support for international
security and multilateral operations such as the United
Nations and ad hoc coalitions. Canada is also seeking to
reduce its financial contributions to the allied
infrastructure program.
In contrast, the 1994 White Paper devotes considerable
attention to the roles and missions of the CF in North
America. It devotes one whole chapter to the protection of
Canada and another to Canada-United States defense
cooperation. There is also discussion about expanding
military links to Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern
23
Europe and to countries in the Asia Pacific area. To this
extent, it would appear that in the post-Cold War era,
Ottawa intends to conduct a security policy more global in
scope than it has for the last 50 years, one firmly anchored
in North America but reaching out to new regions. For
example, there has always been some military presence in the
Pacific, but this generally took second place to the
Atlantic region. Now more emphasis is to be put on ties with
traditional Pacific partners, such as the U.S, Australia,
and New Zealand, as well as the new regional economic
powers.
While the CF may find itself operating further afield,
the government also intends to cut back on military
expenditures. The defense budget is to drop by 14.2 percent
between now and 1997, which entails a reduction in planned
spending by about $2.8 billion over the next 4 years, a
reduction in annual spending of just over $1.6 billion by
the 1997-98 fiscal year compared to spending in fiscal year
1994-95. In that year DND’s budget will be $9.2 billion
compared to the current level of $11.5 billion. By the end
of the decade, the regular force will cut from 74,900 to
60,000, the primary reserves from 29,400 to 20,000, and the
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civilian work force will drop to 20,000 from the present
32,500. There will be commensurate reductions in the number
of senior officers, with generals cut by 25 percent and
colonels by 20 percent. In addition, “about $15 billion
worth of capital equipment will be delayed, reduced, or
cancelled over the next 15 years.” There is to be another
round of base closures and consolidations, most notably the
elimination of all three of the elemental command
headquarters: (Maritime Command (MARCOM), Air Command
(AIRCOM), Land Force Command (LANCOM)) and the relocation of
24
their functions to National Defence Headquarters. All of
this may make it difficult to accept the White Paper’s claim
that DND will maintain “multi-purpose, combat-capable armed
forces able to meet the challenges to Canada’s security both
25
at home and abroad.”
The government argues, however, that in contrast to
previous Canadian experience, the budget is fully
consistent with the White Paper. And the savings derived
from personnel reductions and base closures can be
redirected into giving the Canadian Forces the equipment
they will need to carry out their national and international
26
missions. As announced in the White Paper, among the
cutbacks in equipment will include a 25 percent reduction
for fighter forces and support including the retirement of
all CF-5 fighters and the reduction of operational CF-18s
from 72 to “between 60 and 48" aircraft. But there will be
no reduction in the transport aircraft fleet of 30 C-130s, 5
CC-137s and 5 CC-150s (A110); and the VIP A-310 Airbus will
be re-fitted for a strategic lift and air cargo role. This
will support the ability of the CF to sustain peacekeeping
operations far afield. A replacement for the Labrador
search-and-rescue helicopters will depend upon a decision to
27
replace the Sea King maritime helicopters.
For the Army, which lost its coveted armored role when
Canadian forces were withdrawn from Europe but which has
born the brunt of peacekeeping missions, there will be both
more personnel and new equipment. Its 114 Leopard I tanks,
now in Canada, will be retained for possible deployment
abroad. Some 3,000 troops are to be added to its ranks, and
the government has pledged to purchase new armored personnel
carriers (APCs) by 1997 and to modernize parts of the
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current APC fleet.
The service which emerged the most unscathed from the
White Paper and budget was the Navy. As with the Army, the
Navy has seen wide service in support of U.N. peacekeeping
operations since the end of the Cold War, with deployments
to Haiti and the Adriatic. Canada will retain all 16 of its
surface warships, including 12 new city-class frigates, and
will be acquiring 12 new maritime coastal defense vessels
(MCDV) to “maintain sufficient capability to sealift troops,
equipment and supplies for multilateral operations.” One of
three support ships, the HMCS Provider, which had been
scheduled to be paid off in 1996, will be retained. Also
kept will be the existing force of 18 maritime long-range
patrol aircraft. Shortly after their election in 1993, the
Liberals fulfilled a campaign promise to cancel a $5 billion
program to acquire 50 new helicopters, including 30-year-old
Sea Kings carried by the surface ships. The White Paper
pledges to find an “affordable” replacement. Most
surprisingly, the Government has not ruled out new
submarines and will “explore the option” of acquiring
Upholder class submarines recently constructed by the United
Kingdom.
Thus, while DND will have to do with less, the White
Paper claims that Canada will still have forces capable of
providing for domestic surveillance and sovereignty tasks,
North American defense, and “make a significant contribution
to international peace and stability, within a UN framework,
28
through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries.”
Canada will maintain a naval task group in the Pacific and
Atlantic comprised of destroyers, frigates, submarines, a
support ship, and maritime air. On land, three “separable
battle groups or a brigade group with infantry, armor, and
artillery will be available for deployment. The air forces
will have two fighter squadrons available for NORAD but
could send a wing of tactical fighters and a squadron of
transport aircraft. Some of these forces will be earmarked
for immediate standby, short notice deployment for NATO or
the U.N. In the event of a major contingency abroad, Ottawa
would be prepared to send land, sea and air forces
simultaneously, and ”this could conceivably involve in the
29
order of 10,000 military personnel." However, the White
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Paper indicates that Canada could not send substantial
forces to both contingencies at once, and thus forces would
have to be redeployed from other multilateral operations.
Given Canada’s budget crisis, the CF could have been
asked by the government to do with even smaller forces. For
fiscal year 1994-95, the federal deficit will be $37.9
billion, or more than 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), while the accumulated debt amounts to $546.1 billion.
By fiscal year 1996-97, the government hopes to bring the
deficit down to $24.3 billion, but interest on the debt will
still be $50.7 billion or nearly a quarter of the federal
30
budget.
With roughly a third of the debt in foreign hands,
there has been continual downward pressure on the Canadian
dollar which now stands at just above 70 cents U.S.
International money markets were demanding a tough budget
from Finance Minister Paul Martin, and they got one. Ottawa
intends to implement major reductions in expenditures,
including on social services such as health care and
welfare. This will entail cutting back and changing the
transfer payments to the provinces. In addition, government
operating expenditures will be slashed. Over the next 3
years the federal civil service will be reduced by 14
31
percent or 45,000.
Under these circumstances, DND is fortunate not to have
suffered further reductions. It will still have the largest
operating budget of any government department. While the
Canadian Forces might contend otherwise, it can be argued
with regard to the 1994 White Paper on defense and 1995
federal budget, that as the slogan of the famous American
beer from Milwaukee used to boast “it doesn’t get any better
than this.”
In addition, civil-military relations have not been
particularly good in Canada during the last several months.
There have been revelations of torture and murder of
civilians by members of the Airborne Regiment during
peacekeeping duties in Somalia leading to a series of courts
martial. This was compounded by exposure of unseemly conduct
recorded on videos and what the government viewed as failure
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by senior officers to deal with the unit’s problems. All of
which led Defence Minister Collenette to disband the
regiment earlier this year even though the Chief of the
Defence Staff advised against it.
Should the economy experience slower growth and rising
interests rates, Mr. Martin’s predictions may not come to
fruition. It likely would be, then, that in next year’s
budget, or even before, the Liberal government would not
hesitate to make further cuts in defense expenditures.
Indeed, it can be argued that as far as Prime Minister
Chretien and most of his Ministers are concerned, there is
always room for less defense spending. There would be little
public outcry in light of the fact that the public and the
provinces are being asked to do a lot with less.
Canada-U.S. Defense Relations.
The level and tempo of Canada-U.S. defense relations,
particularly in NORAD, has been decreasing since the late
1980s. The epoch-making transformation of global affairs
notwithstanding, the NORAD agreement was renewed in April
1991 for another 5 years. In sharp contrast to 1986, the
renewal went almost unnoticed, even in Canada. Also little
noticed was the emphasis placed upon NORAD’s role in
counter-narcotics activities, indicating that the air
sovereignty mission encompassed surveillance and monitoring
of aircraft suspected of smuggling illegal drugs. Counternarcotics had become an important task for the U.S. armed
forces in the late 1980s, and the Canadian Air Force was
32
cooperating in the air side of the effort.
By the late 1980s, the frequency of Soviet Bear bomber
flights near North America was “significantly reduced during
1989,” down to just 21. In the 1986-1988 period, there had
33
been as many as 66 flights per year. A U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee report released in July 1990 noted that
“the Soviets have ceased submarine patrols off the U.S.
coast, and flights by Bear bombers to Canada’s northern
border.” Accordingly, Washington cut back on plans contained
in the 1985 North American Air Defence Modernization
agreement, including cancellation of two and the
deactivation of one of the four new Over the Horizon
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Backscatter (OTH-B) radars. Congress had stopped all
funding for the American contribution to the Forward
Operating Locations (FOLs), while budget cuts in the United
States Air Force were creating problems in the apportionment
of costs for the Northern Warning System (NWS).
More recent American actions with respect to air
defense, however, suggest that this NORAD role has been
significantly reduced in importance. After some delay and
difficulties over the apportionment of construction
expenditures, the full NWS will be completed. However, the
United States Air Force and Canada will run it at a very
reduced capacity in order to lower operation and maintenance
costs. Congress, though, has continued to refuse funding for
the American portion of the cost of the forward operating
locations, although Canada went ahead and constructed four
of them.
The classic air defense mission against massive bomber
attack has been put on the “back burner.” Forces for this
mission have been put in a “regeneration” category with
expectation that there will be as much as a 2-year strategic
warning of any insurgent air threat. There are no longer
“war plans” but “concept plans” for North American air
35
defense. NORAD is also likely to scale back its counternarcotics role, as the United States has become persuaded
that this and other military measures were having little
36
impact in the drug war. If the USAF experiences additional
funding cuts, there may be even more reductions in NORAD’s
air defense and air sovereignty roles.
With the air defense mission waning and with the threat
of large scale ballistic missile attack all but gone, focus
has shifted to the possible role of NORAD in some kind of
limited missile defense, both for North America and abroad.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
former CINCNORAD American General Charles Horner stressed
the need for NORAD to continue with its binational air
sovereignty mission. He also emphasized “the national
necessity for an integrated ballistic missile defense . . .
system–a system that will best protect deployed forces, as
37
well as North American borders . . .” In a fall 1993
article, Executive Officer to the Deputy CINCNORAD Canadian
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Lieutenant General Brian Smith seemed to suggest that the
command could become the North American component of a
multinational “global warning initiative” designed to meet
the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and missile technology. In addition to meeting
threats against North America, the system could be applied
38
“in a regional content (sic) anywhere in the world.” For
the United States, the emphasis following upon the Gulf War
has been less on the massive Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
envisioned by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and
more on Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Traditionally, Canada
has been wary of BMD because of its allegedly adverse
implications for strategic nuclear stability and arms
control. But when President Bush suggested a multilateral
approach to BMD two years ago, Prime Minister Mulroney
indicated Canadian interest.
In the meantime, the end of the Cold War saw a
continuation of close cooperation between the Canadian Navy
and the United States Navy (USN). In contrast to aerospace
ties which were concentrated in a single binational command,
naval relations have largely been on a strictly navy-to-navy
basis with a myriad of arrangements that have allowed the
two maritime forces to operate closely together. Reflecting
the USN’s own organization and the NATO emphasis of overall
Canadian defense policy, this cooperation has been much more
extensive in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, although
there have been long-standing arrangements and joint
exercises on the west coast. In the 1980s there was some
Canadian concern about the operation of USN submarines in
the Arctic which led to the proposal in the 1987 Canadian
White Paper to acquire a fleet of nuclear-power attack
submarines capable of under-ice operations. This project was
abandoned in 1989. As in the air, the end of the Cold War
saw a decline in the sea-based danger to North America,
which has reduced the importance of maritime surveillance.
Given the absence of a direct threat to the continent,
it is surprising that, as noted above, an entire chapter in
the White Paper is devoted to defense relations with the
United States. The DND argues that the defense ties with the
United States must be maintained if Canada is to continue
reaping its varied rewards, which have included increased
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training and operational experience, retention of an
influential voice in American defense policy formulation,
continued access to significant defense-related
intelligence, and maintaining access to the large U.S.
39
defense industrial market. For these reasons, the
Canadian/American defense partnership has rightfully earned
a fair number of supporters.
Most noteworthy of the White Paper recommendations is
that the NORAD agreement should be renewed in 1996. The
document admits that direct threats to North American
security are unlikely in the foreseeable future and assumes
that any new threat will provide 1-2 years of strategic
warning. The White Paper therefore maintains that Canada
must continue to support a foundation of defense cooperation
with the United States which could be expanded if needed.
For the Air Force, the White paper states that Canada will
maintain aerospace surveillance, missile warning, and air
defense capabilities at a significantly reduced level, while
preserving the ability to regenerate forces should a
40
strategic threat to the continent arise.
The White Paper also declares that greater emphasis
must be placed within the agreement on the examination of
41
ballistic missile defense options.
The Government will examine closely those areas
which may require updating in accordance with
evolving challenges to continental security.
Canada will work towards an agreement that
furthers our national interest and meets our
42
defence needs, now and into the 21st century.
Canada’s potential role in ballistic missile
defence will not be determined in isolation, but
in conjunction with the evolution of North
American and possibly NATO-wide aerospace defence
43
arrangements.
Canada’s willingness to participate in the research and
development of a ballistic missile defensive system marks a
major departure from the previous Canadian view, especially
that of the Liberal Party. The American emphasis upon TMD
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has made Canadian involvement more acceptable. As the Chief
of the Defence Staff John de Chastelain noted, the idea of
protecting North America is now “recognized as pie in the
sky.” Rather “We’re talking about joint involvement in the
development of a product that would produce a regional BDM
44
system.”
It is, though, unclear how much emphasis the United
States intends to put into BMD for North America. The
Clinton administration is continuing the emphasis on TMD for
the protection of American forces forwardly deployed. In
February 1995 an effort by some Republicans in the House of
Representatives to speed up the fielding of a BMD system to
defend the United States was defeated in favor of more
45
funding for TMD.
Test and evaluation agreements will also continue
under the White Paper–the February 1993 agreement to renew
the Canada-U.S. Test and Evaluation Program was reaffirmed
“as an integral part of our bilateral defence relationship.”
The White Paper also indicated that Canada will seek to
maintain cooperation in defense production through the
defense production/defense sharing agreements, which will
46
continue.
In view of the declining threat (never that great in
the past), it should be possible to sustain joint
arrangements for the surveillance of the maritime approaches
to the continent. The existing maritime forces, plans to
augment the naval presence in the Pacific, recent
improvements to the underwater surveillance system, and
plans to upgrade Maritime Command’s information and tactical
data links, including those with NORAD, will make the
Canadian maritime contribution to continental defense
47
actually better than it is at present.
Another somewhat new dimension to bilateral cooperation
is in the area of joint warfare–the effort to better
coordinate air, sea, and land forces. This has become a high
priority in the United States. In October 1993, the United
States Atlantic Command (USACOM), headquartered in Norfolk,
Virginia, became the joint headquarters for most American
forces in the continental United States (CONUS). In shifting
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“from a predominately naval headquarters to a more balanced
combatant command headquarters,” USACOM will “facilitate the
identification, training, preparation, and rapid response of
designated CONUS-based forces currently under the Army’s
Forces Command, the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, the Air Forces’s
Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Marine Corps’ Marine
Forces Atlantic.” As well as preparing forces for overseas
deployments, this new headquarters would be responsible for
the land defense of CONUS and direct any response to natural
disasters “and other requirements for military support to
civil authorities when requested by State Governors and as
48
directed by the President.”
It is interesting to note that, although ACC will be a
component of USACOM, the new command was not given the
continental air defense role, leaving this role to NORAD.
The creation of USACOM will have other implications for
Canada. Its commander, now for the first time a Marine
general and not a USN Admiral, will still be NATO’s Supreme
Allied Commander Atlantic. In addition, to mesh with
USACOM’s joint approach, the Canadian forces will have their
own “joint task headquarters” to support the Canada-U.S.
basic security plan. This will give the Canadian Army more
of a role than in the past and a “brigade group and
associated support elements” will be assigned North American
49
roles (in additional to other missions).
In general, Canada’s military capabilities will be more
than adequate for continued defense ties with the United
States in the defense of North America. At sea and in the
air there has always been the so-called “defence against
help” argument, which stresses that, unless Canada is
prepared to monitor its own air and sea approaches, the
United States will see to it, thereby challenging Canadian
sovereignty and independence. In accordance with this
argument, Canada has mounted a contribution to the air and
maritime defense of North America. Yet this argument is
losing much of its persuasiveness as the United States
itself questions the need for a major air and maritime
surveillance effort, a fact that has evidently not been lost
on Ottawa.
Moreover, the forces, especially naval and air units
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required to sustain cooperation with the United States in
continental defense, are almost identical to those needed
for domestic tasks. This is especially the case for the
Navy, whose surface ships, aircraft and submarines are
expected to assert Canadian sovereignty and protect offshore resources. Indeed, since those earmarked for NATO and
the U.N. are also now based in Canada, they, too, are
available for North American tasks.
In the past, Canada’s security relations with the
United States have always been problematic, not so much from
an equipment standpoint but in the context of domestic
politics. This is because Canadian governments have been
caught between their support for collective defense, which
has made military cooperation with the United States
essential, and popular fears that national sovereignty and
independence would be compromised by too close an
association with the Pentagon. For this reason NATO, with
its multilateral framework, had always been stressed more
than the strictly bilateral NORAD or other continental
arrangements. In addition, the close working relationship
between the Canadian and American air forces and
bureaucracies has always lent a faint air of illegitimacy to
50
NORAD. The suggestion is that the Canadian military, eager
to play in the big leagues, has promoted an integration of
defense efforts of which the political leadership has not
always been fully cognizant.
In the present international circumstances with no real
threat to North America, a renewal of NORAD, especially one
that includes an explicit reference to BMD, might be
expected to encounter criticism that this is anachronistic
business, as usual at the expense of a new, more independent
Canadian defense policy. Moreover, with the North American
Free Trade Agreement binding Canada ever more closely to the
United States economically, Ottawa could anticipate a
reaction against further continentalist policies.
However, this is not 1986 when the Canadian “peace
movement” weighed in heavily against NORAD renewal, largely
on the grounds that it would draw Canada into the Strategic
Defense Initiative. For many in the movement, the problem
has not been the roles and missions of the Canadian Forces,
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but the allegedly dangerous defense policies of the United
States. With the “threat of annihilation without
representation” gone and with the United States drawing down
its military and debating the merits of continued military
expenditure, there appears to be much less sensitivity in
the public and the media. Indeed, drawing upon media
commentary in the United States, the prevalent view in the
public mind is that the Clinton administration, pressured by
the Republicans, is not doing enough around the world and
51
may even be heading toward neo-isolationism. (Even former
New Democratic Party leader Edward Broadbent called upon the
United States to invade Haiti.) In this sense, peace has
weakened the peace movement, depriving it of its ability to
combine fear of nuclear war with Canadian nationalism.
Media, reporting on Secretary Perry’s visit in May 1994,
suggest that the popular concern over the link between
independence and bilateral defense cooperation appears to be
waning. (Secretary Perry even helped the new Liberal
government on the public relations front when he announced,
just prior to his visit, that the United States would no
longer need to test cruise missiles in Canada, something the
Liberals had pledged to stop during the election campaign).
There was scant mention made of NORAD in the testimony
by interests groups before the parliamentary committees on
foreign and defense policy. In their reports, the committees
called for renewal of NORAD. Indeed, the foreign policy
committee, while cautioning against greater economic
dependence on the United States, not only supported renewal
but called for a “further shift of emphasis from air defence
52
to global space surveillance.” The opposition parties, the
right-of-center Reform Party and the pro-Quebec
sovereigntist Bloc Quebecois, (BQ), for different reasons,
favor continued military ties with the United States and
will support a NORAD renewal.
Under these circumstances the Liberal government
clearly felt that it was safe in not only including its
intention to renew NORAD in the White Paper, but indicating
its interests in BMD. There is likely to be little public
opposition to renewal on grounds of national sovereignty and
independence. Indeed, it may be argued that the importance
attached to continuing bilateral defense relations in the
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White Paper was only possible because the Canadian
government appreciates that such cooperation will not place
great demands upon the Canadian forces.
@LEFTHEADING = Contributions to International Security.
In the ultimately successful struggle of containment
and deterrence, it was always more important to Washington
that Canadian forces be deployed in Europe than in Canada.
Hence the anomaly in the 1950s and 1960s that, while
Canadians were in France and Germany, U.S. forces helped
stand the “long polar watch” in Canada. Similarly, in the
aftermath of the Cold War, Washington is quite interested in
Canada’s participation in peacekeeping and its recent
variations. Indeed, the Americans seem more concerned that
Canada play a full role in Bosnia than Bagotville, in
Cambodia than Cold Lake, in the Adriatic than in the Arctic.
During his visit to Ottawa last May, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Perry, while calling for continued bilateral
cooperation, also urged Canada to remain active in NATO and
to maintain “robust, flexible and sustainable” forces for
53
global operations.
To a certain extent, therefore, the 1994 White Paper
with its multilateral orientation and pledge to maintain a
global combat capability would seem to mesh well with
current contemporary American defense policy, which stresses
the need to remain engaged abroad, including through
54
multilateral arrangements. In this regard, the links being
developed between the Canadian forces and USACOM could also
serve to foster Canada-U.S. cooperation since one of the
prime tasks of the new American command is preparing U.S.
forces for deployment overseas, including for peacekeeping
operations.
However, while cooperation outside North America
continues, it is premature to conclude that the two
countries are about to engage in a new joint approach to
international security threats, despite Ottawa’s commitment
to multilateralism. This is because there is a fundamental
difference between the two countries in how they approach
multilateral solutions and operations. For the United
States, multilateralism is a tool to be used when it can
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support the achievement of American interests, legitimize
U.S. action, and harmonize western policies. In addition,
55
Washington wants allies, especially in NATO, to do more.
Americans want to lead, on their own terms, and will be
looking for followers.
Canada views multilateralism as a means of continuing
to participate actively in global affairs so as to increase
the influence it might otherwise not exercise, including
influence over the United States. It does want to see
Washington take the lead on many issues but hopes to use
multilateralism as a mechanism of restraining unilateral
American actions and policies. Above all, Canada does not
equate a commitment to multilateralism as requiring that it
assume a greater share of the burden for defending western
interests around the globe. The limited Canadian involvement
in the Gulf War, though fully supportive of the U.S.-led
coalition, reflected Ottawa’s modest assessment of what
56
Canada can be expected to contribute.
Although Ottawa is committed to continued participation
in NATO and has pledged to send forces to Europe in the
event of an emergency, the withdrawal of Canadian forces
from Germany, combined with a desire to reduce contributions
to allied infrastructure programs, sends a clear signal that
the Alliance is no longer the focal point of Canadian
defense policy. At the same time, Ottawa seems convinced
that it can still use its membership in NATO as an entry
point into European security affairs from a political
standpoint. The White Paper notes that:
@BLOCK QUOTE = Canada will be an active participant in
the Alliance’s ongoing efforts to reach out to the countries
of Central Europe as well as those of the Commonwealth of
Independent States. We give our full support to NATO
expansion, but continue to believe that this question must
be addressed very carefully–certainly, the process must not
57
exacerbate Russian fears of encirclement or exclusion.
There is little doubt that the European allies, as well
as the United States, were not happy with this part of the
White Paper any more than with the 1992 decision to pull the
forces out of Germany. But given fiscal realities, this is
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an appropriate position and one that is consistent with
current NATO strategies. If a major new threat emerges in
Europe, there is little doubt that Canada will respond.
Moreover, Ottawa can argue that with over 2,000 troops in
the former Yugoslavia for the last 3 years, Canada is doing
more than its share for European security and doing it in
situations where the Europeans are apparently unable to do
on their own.
But Canada’s involvement in any future security
arrangements that NATO may foster in Europe is to be
undertaken in such a way that they do not place new demands
upon the Canadian forces. As noted above, the forces
earmarked for the Alliance are also available to U.N.
peacekeeping and fall under the general heading of
multilateral operations, especially peacekeeping. Indeed, it
would appear that Ottawa wants NATO to follow its approach
58
by putting the Alliance at the service of the U.N.
Canada has enjoyed a long-standing reputation for
active involvement and support of peacekeeping operations.
As the United Nations has increased its activities in the
post-Cold War era, so has Canadian participation. Since
1989, Canadian forces have been deployed to the Persian Gulf
to participate in Desert Storm and on a multitude of
peacekeeping missions, from Bosnia to Cambodia to Rwanda. As
of the beginning of 1995, 3.6 percent “of all peacekeepers
on duty in the world” were Canadian–some 2,900, with 2,000
of these in the former Yugoslavia. Additional forces were
59
preparing to deploy to Haiti. In addition to the Army, the
AIRCOM’s transport fleet continues to fly humanitarian
relief missions while the Navy has supported U.N.-mandated
embargoes in the Adriatic and off Haiti.
The White Paper applauds the humanitarian aspects of
U.N. action and supports the principles of the U.N. charter
but denigrates the woeful military efficiency of U.N.
60
peacekeeping missions. Chronic lack of funding, an
unmanageable bureaucracy, the archaic structure of the
permanent members of the Security Council, the over reliance
on the goodwill of member nations to contribute forces for
61
U.N. missions –these failings encourage Canadian cynicism
and reluctance to participate in further U.N. peacekeeping
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efforts.
Canada would like to see a more efficient military
command and operations structure put in place for U.N.
missions and believes such a tool is already available in
the current NATO Alliance. The White Paper notes that
“Canada believes that NATO’s reservoir of military
competence and capabilities should make a greater
contribution to U.N. operations,” by “providing the U.N.
with the vigorous military support that it currently
62
lacks.” More efficient and greater military contributions
from NATO would presumably increase the capacity of the U.N.
However, the military tools of NATO must not be decoupled
from the political direction of the U.N. The White Paper
strongly maintains that ultimate political and strategic
direction given by the U.N. must rest with the Security
Council. NATO’s means for U.N. ends can best encapsulate
Canada’s new NATO policy.
If U.N. reform and NATO support are not forthcoming,
then Ottawa might well begin reducing its peacekeeping
operations. This was suggested by the recent decision
regarding Canadian forces in the former Yugoslavia. Ten
Canadians have died in Yugoslavia over the last 3 years,
dozens more were injured, and there are reports of
63
depression leading to suicide among returning soldiers.
Thus while agreeing to replace the units in Bosnia, the
government indicated that it might soon withdraw from there
and consolidate in Croatia where the intensity of the
fighting has been less. “Drawing a parallel with the 29-year
presence of Canadian U.N. peacekeepers in Cyprus which ended
in 1993,” the Minister of Defence told the House of Commons
that “it was urgent for the international community to
understand that it cannot count on Canada to keep troops in
the former Yugoslavia forever while the world waits for some
demonstration of the political will to resolve the
64
dispute.” Many Canadians have also noted that their
government is not included in the contact group seeking to
find a end to the conflict.
In some ways, Canada’s views on reforming the U.N and
partnering it to NATO are mirrored in the United States,
which therefore becomes especially relevant in Canada’s
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relations with the United States in the NATO forum. Although
the United States would also like to see the forces of NATO
take a more active role in U.N missions, especially in the
former Yugoslavia, it is highly unlikely that the
maintenance of sole political direction from the security
council would be acceptable in the United States. The
American view is that reform of the U.N. must precede any
expansion of its military capabilities. The United States is
pressing to change the membership in the Security Council to
65
include both Japan and Germany, to reform the funding
66
procedures for U.N. operations, and to streamline the
bureaucratic process. Clearer political mandates and more
stringent criteria for measuring the likelihood of success
must be applied in future missions. In addition, the United
States will place more conditions on when, where, and how
American troops are to be placed under the operational
command of U.N. commanders, if at all.
Indeed, so strong is the American desire for management
reform of the United Nations that in 1993 the United States
withheld 10 percent of its U.N. dues until the post of
67
Inspector- General was established. Charges of waste,
corruption, and mismanagement may inhibit greater U.S.
endorsement of or participation in U.N. peacekeeping
68
missions. In addition, from the viewpoint of many
Americans, the United States should be charging the U.N. for
the costs which the Pentagon incurs “in peacekeeping
operations approved by the Security Council but not directed
by the United Nations.” Included here would be the fall
69
1994 intervention into Haiti.
In May 1994 the Clinton administration, responding to
congressional criticism, issued Presidential Decision
Directive 25 (PDD-25), which called for reform of the U.N.
70
and limits on American military participation. Opposition
to peacekeeping has increased with the new Republicancontrolled Congress. In February 1995 the House of
Representatives, by a vote of 241 to 181, approved a bill
that included provisions that went beyond PDD-25, curtailing
the authority of the President to participate in
peacekeeping operations and “set strict limits on when
American troops may serve under United Nations command.”
Congress would be afforded a greater role in determining
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where, when, and how American troops were used. The bill
would also allow the United States to deduct from
Washington’s annual peacekeeping dues “the extra cost the
Pentagon incurs in American-run military missions that
receive the blessing of the United Nations,” such as the
Haitian operation. In 1994, those costs were estimated to be
$1.7 billion, an amount that would have wiped out the
American assessment. Although the bill provides for
Presidential waivers, these would only have amounted to
71
about $240 million.
It is unclear whether the bill will pass the Senate in
its present form. On the recommendation of the Secretaries
of State and Defense, President Clinton has threatened to
veto it if it does. Given that a veto would be difficult to
override, it is likely that the provisions of the bill will
be moderated. Administration officials argue that if
implemented, the provisions would cripple U.N. peacekeeping
operations and provide an excuse for other nations to cut
back their contributions.
These indications of decreasing American willingness to
participate in or provide funds for U.N.-directed
peacekeeping missions, unless on American terms, could have
important effects on Canadian defense policy, compelling
further evaluation of Canada’s contributions. A U.N. budget
bereft of U.S. funds is not going to have the necessary
monies to carry out much in the way of peacekeeping.
Similarly, if the United States withholds certain
specialized equipment only it possesses–primarily the rapid
air and sealift capacity so necessary for quick deployment–
then peacekeeping missions will be grounded before they are
begun. If American participation and funding are reduced,
then so might Canadian participation in peacekeeping, which
has always relied on American monetary, logistical, and
military support.
Beyond peacekeeping, Canada is also showing a new
interest in other regions of the world, particularly with
the countries of the Far East and those of Latin America.
For example, Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s most publicized
72
trade missions have been to these two areas. This current
emphasis on bolstering trade relations in areas other than
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Europe does not necessarily imply any lessening of Canada’s
strategic, cultural, and economic ties with that area–but it
does indicate that these newer areas are going to require
greater attention by Canadian defense planners as they
absorb an increasing portion of Canadian trade.
The White Paper reflects this state of affairs. It
documents how Canadian interest in the security of the Asia
Pacific region has become much more active–through the
encouragement of regional security dialogues such as the
Asia Regional Forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in
Asia Pacific, and the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific
73
Security. Canada will expand the current program of
bilateral military contacts with a variety of Asian nations,
including Japan, South Korea, and members of the Association
74
of South East Asian Nations.
Increased Canadian military ties in Latin America, the
Pacific, and elsewhere will involve cooperation with the
United States. But this new interest in broader security
issues cannot be equated with a Canadian commitment to the
security of these regions, a commitment necessitating
greatly expanded military operations. It must be
acknowledged that the key motivating factor behind expanding
defense ties is the economic consideration, not that of
traditional military security. Recently, a high-level
Canadian military delegation went to China to establish
contacts with the Peoples Liberation Army and to explore
75
opportunities for military exports. A cruise by Canada’s
newest warship into the Persian Gulf was likewise intended
to promote Canadian defense products. Here, Canada
encounters the United States trying to do the same thing.
Thus in the wider world, the two countries are sometimes
competitors, both seeking out new markets.
Ottawa believes that as Canada seeks out new trading
opportunities, there should be some commensurate
augmentation in military links with other regions and
countries outside the traditional North Atlantic triangle.
To this extent, it is unlikely that beyond staff talks,
exchanges of information, and the occasional port visit and
participation in joint exercises, Canada is prepared to
commit itself to new concrete security arrangements. The
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emphasis upon naval ties is noteworthy since they are a
relatively inexpensive way to maintain a nominal “global”
presence. And just because forces exercise together does not
mean they will fight together. Indeed, the attractiveness of
these new links seems to rest for the most part in their
relatively low political, and above all financial, costs.
Even if the Canadian forces can hold the line on
further cuts, the reductions already announced will make it
difficult to retain more or less balanced air, sea and
ground forces. And while this may worry the military and its
supporters, it is evident that it is not especially
troublesome to the government whose approach to the role of
the armed forces in Canadian foreign policy, like that
followed during the Cold War, does not place an especially
high value on combat capability. In the present global
security environment, Ottawa apparently believes that not
only can it secure its place in various international fora
with a lot less, but that military hardware is no longer the
coin of the realm in the highly competitive post-Cold War
global environment. Thus, Washington may well be
disappointed if it looks to Canada for support in meeting
regional contingencies in the post-Cold War world.
Conclusion.
As defense analyst Douglas Bland has observed, the new
policy moves away from a “strategy of commitments” toward
one of “strategy of choice derived from Canada’s national
interests.” The 1994 White Paper thus prepares “the way for
a national strategy and armed forces structure more
appropriate to the new security environment.” It is a
76
document about “choice and change.”
The 1994 Canadian White Paper is indeed about change
and choice. Ottawa has changed defense policy from its Cold
War orientation. But it has also chosen to sustain its
traditional alliance ties that have marked Canadian defense
policy since 1945. But here, too, there is change. Thus, for
the first time in two generations, NATO will no longer be
the focal point, in either word or deed, of defense policy.
But it is also the result of fiscal realities. The
government evidently believes that membership in NORAD and
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NATO, and any new military ties it forges, will be
inexpensive. It will afford Canada the ability to maintain
close defense relations with the world’s most powerful
nation and an array of medium powers at acceptable (and
indeed declining) levels of expenditure.
As with previous White Papers, the 1994 document very
much reflects the global trends that preceded its writing.
Not surprisingly, then, peacekeeping constitutes an
important part of the new policy. Here, it may be argued
that this White Paper will suffer the same fate of its
predecessors in that its proposal will be more appropriate
to the immediate past than the future. This is because the
rising tide of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era may
well have peaked. But, the White Paper acknowledges the
problems of contemporary peacekeeping. It does not put its
emphasis upon this role exclusively, but rather in
maintaining a general commitment to multilateral approaches
to security. To be sure, there is a certain hollowness to
the White Paper’s claims for global combat capability. And
the new links, which the government indicates it wishes to
establish with regional powers, carry little implication of
solid security commitments. Nevertheless, the proposed
posture is about as much as the Canadian forces, and
Canada’s allies, could expect.
The 1994 Canadian White Paper on defense gets it right
this time. But this is not so much because it offers an
impeccably reasoned and clairvoyant national security
strategy. But, rather because it is largely consistent with
overall foreign policy objectives, what the public purse is
capable of paying for and what the Canadian people are
likely to support. As such, it responds to the challenge of
a more secure, yet unpredictable security situation abroad
and the more precarious, yet inescapably certain realities
at home.
In an ironic sense, Canada may well find that it can
finally put its particular, if not always successful,
experience in setting national strategy in lean times to
good use.
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